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Denver: Rule 10b-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law Remed

NOTES
RULE lOb-5 DAMAGES:
THE RUNAWAY DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON LAW REMEDY*
The obscure beginnings' of rule lOb-5 2 hardly augered the dominant role
it would eventually play as the most frequently used 3 antifraud provision in
the federal securities laws. Originally designed merely to remedy an oversight
in existing federal securities legislation - the lack of protection for defrauded
sellers4 - the scope of the rule has been vastly expanded by substantial relaxation of the traditional requirements of common law fraud.5 While the sub*EDITOR's NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the Fall 1974 quarter.
1. "We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember whether
we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper around to all of the
commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and tossed it on the table indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Summer Pike who said, 'Well, we are against fraud
aren't we?' That is how it happened." Comments of Milton V. Freeman in ABA Section of
Corp., Banking &cBus. Law, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Law, 22
Bus. LAw 793, 921-23 (1967).
2. "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interestate commerce, or of the mails or any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security." SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1975), adopted under authority of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §10, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970) (hereinafter referred to as the
1934 Act). For legislative history see 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW - FRAUD SEC RULE 1OB-5
§2.2 (1973).
3. During the period 1946-1962, there were 54 reported cases based on alleged violations
of rule 10b-5. Since that time reported cases have averaged almost 100 a year. Ruder, Civil
Liability Under Rule lob-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627,
687-90 (1963).
4. The only protection for defrauded sellers was §15(c), now §15(c)(1); which covered
over-the-counter purchases of securities by brokers and dealers. See 1 L. Loss, SECURTIES
REGULATION 1426 (1961).
5. Neither §10 nor rule l0b-5 expressly provides a private right of action, but such a
right has been implied. E.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951);
accord, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 817 (1966). See Klein, The Extension of a Private Remedy to Securities Investors Under
SEC Rule lOb-5, 20 U. MiAMI L. REV. 81 (1965). Recently the Supreme Court joined the
circuits in extending a private right of relief. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971). Of all the traditional common law fraud elements, materiality has
survived the rigors of judicial interpretation most successfully. If anything, materiality has
subsumed the other elements. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972), the Supreme Court effectively disposed of the reliance requirement in an omission
case: "All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision." Id. at
153-54. There is some discord not only over whether scienter is required, but also over the
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stantive development of 10b-5 has been accomplished through analysis of the
aims and purposes of the rule, the parallel development of 10b-5 damages has
occurred without the same analytical scrutiny.6 Damages have generally been
awarded as a matter of course, with little attention to the policies underlying
the rule. Because the method of arriving at damage awards for violations of
rule 10b-5 is not codified 7 courts have been left to their own devices in fashioning remedies. The result has been inconsistency from circuit to circuit and
from case to case in the methods employed to determine damages.8 This note
analyzes the develbpment of 10b-5 damages and suggests some considerations
that should enter into the damage calculation.
POLICY
The point of departure for any analysis of damage awards for violation of
rule 10b-5 must be the policies that underlie the rule itself. The adoption of
section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1974,9 pursuant to which rule
lOb-5 was promulgated, apparently received little legislative consideration.
During hearings on the bill, the Administration's spokesman described in one
sentence what was eventually to become section 10(b): "Subsection 10(b) says
meaning of scienter. The debate centers primarily on the question of whether negligence is
sufficient to support a private lOb-5 action. The Second Circuit described scienter as encompassing "lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct." SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968); see 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note
2, §8.4; Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 48 N.C. L. REv. 482
(1970). Privity as a requisite to lOb-5 recovery has similarly been abandoned, allowing suits
by open market plaintiffs. E.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951);
Miller v. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); see Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule
10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361 (1965).
6. The potential for leviathan liability in nonprivity situations has prompted some discussion of the issue. One commentator has estimated the potential damages in Texas Gulf
Sulphur at $390 million, approximately $150 million more than the company's net worth.
Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur- The Second Round, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423 (1969).
7. Since private actions under rule lOb-5 are not based upon specific statutory authority,
they lack the statutory damage limitations found in other sections of the securities acts. For
example §§9(e) and 18 of the 1934 Act require some showing of wilfulness and causation, and
§18 allows a good faith defense. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§77 et.
seq. (1970) (hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act), provides a due diligence defense and
places a limitation on damages. Section 12(2) of the Act requires strict privity between buyer
and seller. See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 CoLur.
L. REv. 12 (1966).
8. Professor Ruder has suggested that the difficulties encountered in measuring damages
as well as their potential magnitude are important substantive considerations which should
be taken into account in deciding the merits of particular cases. He also suggests that privity
and state of mind, which have largely been phased out of lOb-5, should play a part in the
damage determination. Ruder, supra note 6, at 450. He also suggests that the burden on tippees, whose guilt may only be secondary, be lessened by allowing contribution and indemnification according to degree of fault. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud
Cases: Aiding and Abetting Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, In demniflcation, and Contribution,
120 U. PA. L. Rav. 597, 665 (1972).
9. 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970).
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'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.' "10 Professor Loss believes
that the juxtaposition of section 10(b) with the preceding provisions in the
statute, which regulate such practices as market manipulation, trading in puts
and calls, short selling, and stop loss orders, suggests the section was intended
to be a catch-all."
Rule lOb-5 itself was published in a 1942 SEC release which merely stated
that:
[T]he previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole
in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by
from buying securities if they enprohibiting individuals or companies
2
gage in fraud in their purchase.'
In Speed v. TransamericaCorp.'3 a somewhat broader purpose was ascribed
to rule lOb-5. The court viewed the rule as "an attempt to provide some degree
of equalization of bargaining position in order that the minority may exercise
an informed judgment .

. 14 In

this context, perhaps the more realistically

attainable goal is that of ensuring a uniform informational environment in
which to trade. 15 This concept of rule lOb-5 as a disclosure provision is of relatively recent vintage. 16 A final purpose evident on the face of the rule is simply
the prohibition against certain types of deceptive conduct in the sale of secur7
ities.'
Given the multifarious purposes ascribed to the rule, a measure of damages
based on a deterrent rationale would serve both the positive and prohibitive
10.

Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Int'l & Foreign

Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), cited in 2 L. Loss,

SECURITIES REGULATION

3528 (Supp.

1969).
11. L. Loss, supra note 10, at 3528.
12. SEC, Securities Exch. Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
13. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
14. Id. at 829; see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801, 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1970); 1
A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §3.2; Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5
on Broker-Dealers,57 CORNELL L. REV. 869 (1972).
15. "The Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. "The keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities legislation is disclosure....
The Commission's functions and responsibilities under the two basic securities laws are
broadly of two types: first, to preside over the processes of disclosure, especially by issuers of
securities upon which these laws so basically rely; and second, to regulate substantive conduct
in the securities markets, both directly, and by supervision of industry self-regulation."
SECuRITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcuRrriEs MARKErs,

H.R. Doc.

No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963), cited in Knauss, A Reappraisalof the Role of Disclosure,
62 MICH. L. REV. 607 (1964).
17. See 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §12.3. This policy has been stated as "complete and
effective sanctions, public and private, with respect to the duties and obligations imposed by
the Securities Acts .... Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). See also Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953). Compare Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1971): "The principal purpose of civil liability in
the 1933 Act is, in fact, deterrent rather than compensatory."
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aspects of lOb-5. If the object of a damage assessment were simply to control
behavior, the only question that would need to be asked is how effectively a
given measure accomplishes that end.' Inherent in an award of damages, however, is the independent factor of compensation. 19 The compensation concept
is incorporated in the statute in the form of section 28's prohibition against
recovery in excess of actual damages,2 0 and also appears in the common law
2
tort principles that adhere to rule lOb-5. 1
Striking a proper balance between just compensation and effective deterrence presents obvious difficulties. A given fact situation may militate in favor
of either deterrence or compensation. Thus, the proper emphasis in determining lOb-5 damages may depend on the nature of the securities transaction at
issue. The first portion of the analysis below deals with what might loosely be
termed "privity transactions," 22 and the second with "non-privity" or "openmarket" transactions.2s
Piuvrry TRANSACTIONS

Broker-DealerViolations
The treatment of broker-dealer24 violations at this point is somewhat
anomalous in the sense that a privity relationship depends on whether the
broker is trading for his own account.25 Because of the personal nature of the
relationship and the dissimilarity between the relevant damage concerns here
and those present in open market transactions, however, the subject lends it18. This is true with respect to SEC enforcement actions and administrative sanctions
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Recently, however, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), on rehearing, 404 U.S. 1064
(1972), the SEC succeeded in recovering damages to be applied for the benefit of future
claimants.
19. "The object of an award of damages is to give the plaintiff compensation for the
damage, loss, or injury he has suffered." H. MCGREGOR & J. MAYNE, McGREGOR ON DAMAGES 6
(13th ed. 1972).
20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §28, 15 U.S.C. §78bb (1970), reads in pertinent part:
"No person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter
shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of."
21. The implied right of civil recovery under lOb-5 rests on two theories: statutory tort
and statutory voidability. The former involves the notion that one harmed by violation of a
statute enacted for the benefit of persons similarly situated is entitled to recover damages.
1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §2A(1)(a).
22. Transactions referred to here are those which involve an identifiable buyer and seller.
Privity as used is not to be taken in a strict sense. The intent is closer to the "semblance of
privity" referred to in Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Telev. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
23. The transactions encompassed within the term refer to those lacking an identifiable
buyer-seller relationship, and those in which the defendant may not have bought or sold at
all.
24. Henceforth broker-dealer will be referred to simply as broker.
25. Whether privity exists between a broker-dealer and his customer depends upon
whether the broker-dealer is acting as agent or principal- that is, whether or not he is selling
or buying for his own account.
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self to discussion at this juncture. In addition to the many other rules and regulations pursuant to which liability may attach, 26 broker-dealers must also act
within the strictures of rule lOb-5. For example, the rule proscribes the practice
of "churning" by brokers.2 7 Churning-5 occurs when a broker has control over
an account 29 and trades for personal gain 30 in quantities disproportionate to
the size and character of the account.2 1 While churning has been dealt with
primarily by the Securities and Exchange Commission,3 2 aggrieved customers
26. For example, under the 1933 Act the broker may incur liability by making false and
misleading statements in the registration statement when acting as an underwriter, 15 U.S.C.
§77k (1970), or by offering or selling unregistered securities, 15 U.S.C. §771 (1970). The
broker may subject himself to liability under the 1934 Act by manipulating a security listed
on a national exchange, 15 U.S.C. §78i (1970), or by extending credit in violation of margin
requirements, 15 U.S.C. §78g (1970).
27. The duty of the broker to refrain from churning arises from the "shingle" theory,
which holds that the broker's schizophrenic role gives rise to an implied representation that
he will deal fairly with his customers. The broker is at once an investment advisor and a
salesman whose livelihood depends upon the transactions he is able to generate. The shingle
theory was first articulated in Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388 (1930), an administrative
proceeding, and later received judicial approval in Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d
434 (2d Cir. 1943). In addition to the demands placed upon the broker in his dealings with
the customer under 10b-5, his recommendations must have a reasonable basis and be suited
to the needs of the customer under NASD rules.
28. SEC Rule 15cl-7, 17 C.F.R. §240.15cl-7 (1975) defines churning with respect to discretionary accounts as trading which is "excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial
resources and character of such account." This practice constitutes, under the above cited rule,
"a manipulative, deceptive . . . device" which is forbidden by §15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. §78o(c)(l) (1970), governing over-the-counter markets. A discretionary account is one
in which the customer gives the broker discretion as to the purchase and sale of securities or
commodities, including selection, timing, and price to be paid or received. Stevens v. Abbot,
Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 8536, 839 (E.D. Va. 1968). Under 17 C.F.R. §240.15b10-5 (1975),
brokers registered under §15 of the 1934 Act who are not members of the NASD must obtain
written consent to maintain discretionary authority over an account. Rule 10b-5 litigation has
ventured beyond the bounds marked by the discretionary account requirement of rule 15c1-7,
to find violations where sufficient evidence exists of de facto control over the account. E.g.,
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Stevens v. Abbot, Proctor &
Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
29. A relationship of trust between the broker and the customer may afford strong evidence that the dealer exercised a control over the account. See, e.g., Norris v. Hirshberg, Inc.,
21 SEC 865 (1946). Business naivetdi on the part of the customer is strong evidence of reliance upon the judgment of the broker and of discretion in handling the account. See, e.g.,
Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., CCH 1964-1966 FED. SEc. L. REP. 1F91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
30. Evidence of in-and-out trading and a high rate of turnover have been relied upon to
support the excessive trading element. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42 SEC 811 (1965). Another
relevant factor in determining whether an account has been excessively traded is the size or
amount of commissions earned by the dealer relative to the size of the account. Stevens v.
Abbot, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). But see Carr v.
Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1957).
31. The financial motive of the dealer is usually taken for granted. See Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL I. REv. 869, 935
(1972).
32. E.g., Walker v. SEC, 383 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1967); Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir.
1966); Hersh v. SEC, 365 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1963); Looper & Co., 38 SEC 294 (1958); Norris
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have individually sued successfully for damages under rule 10b-5. s s
In Hecht v. Harris,Upham & Co. 34 the plaintiff35 transferred an acount having a net value of $533,161 to Harris, Upham where it was handled by defendant Wilder, a trusted friend of the plaintiff. Over a period of seven years
the account dropped in net value by approximately $300,000. In excess of
10,000 transactions had occurred during the seven year period, resulting in a
net loss of $12,000 to the plaintiff and commissions and markups of $189,000
for the defendants.36 Damages in the amount of $1,109,000 were claimed, composed of the following elements: (1) the difference between the projected value
of the account had it remained virtually intact and the actual value on the
date the fraud was discovered; 37 (2) the difference between the projected
amount of dividends and bond interest and that actually received;38 (3) all
commissions paid plus markups and interest on advances;3 9 and (4) income
taxes paid on the churning transactions. 40 The district court found the plaintiff, whose account was excessively traded for no other reason than to generate
commissions,/1 to be a naive customer dependent on the defendant for financial
advice. Damages in the amount of total commissions and interest thereon were
therefore allowed.42 Additionally, the court found that a commodities account
had been established as a "mere device for churning the securities account,"
and awarded the amount of net commodities losses.4 3 Finally, because the trading in commodities was accomplished by transfers from the securities account,
recovery of dividend losses was allowed. 44 The court, however, held that the
plaintiff acquiesced in the active handling of the account and rejected the
claim for the difference between the projected value of an unchurned account
& Hirshberg, Inc., 21 SEC 865 (1946). The SEC is authorized to bring suit to enforce the Act
under section 21(b). 15 U.S.C. §78 (1970).
33. See text accompanying notes 34-67 infra.
34. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd in part, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
35. The plaintiff, Mrs. Hecht, was 66 years old at the time of the transfer. This factor
was important in the court's finding that the defendant had exercised control over the account.
36. 283 F. Supp. at 424-25. In addition Mrs. Hecht paid interest of $43,000 for funds advanced to her margin account and capital gains taxes of $64,000.
37. Id. at 427. The projected value of the account was $1,026,000 minus $250,000, the
actual value on the date of discovery, or $776,000.
38. Id. Projected dividends and bond interest amounted to $194,135 compared to the
$124,237 actually received, or $69,898.
39. Id. at 427-28. Including both securities and commodities transactions, fees amounted
to $232,000, of which $174,000 was for commissions, $15,000 for markup, and $43,000 for interest.
40. Id. at 428. Mrs. Hecht paid $64,730 in federal and state income taxes.
41. Id. at 434-37. Mrs. Hecht did not prevail on the count alleging that her account as
handled by the defendants was unsuitable to her needs and objectives. The court found that
by having permitted the handling of her account as an active trading account for 7 years, Mrs.
Hecht was barred by waiver and estoppel from asserting that her account was handled in a
manner inconsistent with her interests. Id. at 429-30.
42. Id. at 440. The amount of the award for commission and interest was $282,000.
43. Id. The award for commodity losses was $78,000.
44. Id. The award for dividend losses was $65,000. In addition, the court awarded damages for two fraudulent transactions unrelated to the churning. Id. at 442-43.
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and its actual value. 45 On appeal,4 6 the Ninth Circuit reduced the damage
award to the extent of the allowance for commodities and dividend losses,
reasoning that the loss of value in the account was due not to the number of
transactions engaged in "but to the unfortunate choice of risk those transactions entailed," a choice in which plaintiff was held to have acquiesced.47
As the dissent in Hecht pointed out,4

8

a problem with limiting recovery to

commissions is that the dealer may have caused damages unrelated to commissions. One possible consequence of excessive trading is unnecessary capital
gains taxation. In Stevens v. Abbot, Proctor & Paine,49 the court approved a
damage award that included all commissions paid as well as a portion of state
and federal capital gains taxes.60 The Stevens court employed a rather unique
formula in computing the extent to which the defendant was liable for plaintiff's taxes. From the total taxes paid each year, the court deducted a percentage of taxes representing the amount of money withdrawn by the plaintiff
for personal use. The remainder was awarded as damages. 51 The damage
award, while mitigated somewhat by the court's refusal to allow total taxes,
was clearly based on the court's assumption that all the transactions were improper.
This same assumption was reflected in the commissions awarded in both
Hecht and Stevens. The Hecht court pointed out that any attempt to make a
distinction between those transactions which were excessive and those which
were reasonable under the circumstances would be fraught with uncertainty.
Moreover, because the uncertainty was caused by the defendant's conduct, the
52
burden should fall on his shoulders.
Of course, an ideal damage award would limit recovery to commissions and
capital gains taxes attributable to excessive transactions only. While it would
be impossible to assign "excessive" or "reasonable" labels to individual transactions on a completely reliable basis, it does not seem manifestly impracticable
to determine statistically, or by means of expert opinion, an average number
of transactions for a hypothetical account of the size and character as that in
question. The amount of commissions awarded would then bear the same relation to the total commissions as the hypothetical average bears to the total
number of transactions. The same sort of analysis would yield a capital gains
tax award. Thus an award of commissions or capital gain taxes would bear
some relation to the actual injury. This approach, while admittedly uncertain,
would not seem to be more so than other methods that have been employed.
45. Id. at 440.
46. 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
47. Id. at 1211-12. Presumably, had Mrs. Hecht not been estopped from asserting that her
account had been handled in a manner unsuitable to her needs, she would have been entitled
to the difference between the projected value as an investment account and the final actual
value. Given the general antipathy of courts to the "benefit-of-the-bargain" award, such an
award would have been unusual.
48. Id. at 1212-13.

49.
50.
51.
52.

288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
Id. at 851.
Id.
283 F. Supp. at 440.
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The trial court in Hecht apparently engaged in similar analysis in arriving at
a figure for dividends lost by the excessive transferring of money from the
securities account to the commodities account.63
Another consequence of excessive trading is the reduction in the customer's
equity in the account through improvident trading. Even in a properly managed account a certain number of decisions are made that operate to the detriment of the account.5 4 In a churned account, where the purpose of the transaction is turnover, it seems reasonable to suppose that the incidence of poor decisions would be much greater. The ideal measure of damages in such situations would be the difference between the projected net value of a properly
traded account and the net value of the churned account. The extrapolation
problem with respect to this measure is even greater than that encountered in
determining excessive commissions. A suggested shortcut for arriving at this
essentially "loss-of-bargain" measure of damages 55 is simply to award the
amount by which the initial value of the account would have increased had, a
selected interest rate 6 been applied over the life of the account. While this approach has the virtue of simplicity, it is arbitrary and amounts to the creation
of a fixed annuity in disregard of the ordinary risks of an actively traded account. 7 Militating in favor of this type of award is the fact that churning is
intentionally fraudulent conduct, perhaps deserving of harsher treatment than
the less culpable instances of lOb-5 fraud.58
A final possibility is the adoption of an out-of-pocket measure determined
by calculating the difference between the initial value of the portfolio and its
ultimate value. As a fixed rule of unvarying application, this form of relief
ignores the possibility that churning may be profitable r9 This measure of
damages was utilized in Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc.,60
which, although a state court case, involved excessive trading.61 In addition to
the difference between the initial value and final value of the portfolio, the
court included the projected lost dividends the account would have generated
had it remained intact. 62 The Twomey decision, however, is distinguishable
53. "Although the amount of loss of dividend and interest income attributable to the
churning of the account is difficult to calculate, the Court, viewing the evidence as a whole,
finds that the excessive transactions in this case did further damage plaintiff by causing her to
lose dividend income in an amount not less than a further $65,000." Id.

54. It could be argued that the number of beneficial decisions would increase in the same
proportion. It seems likely though, given the motivation of the churning broker and the frequency of transactions, that the proportion of detrimental decisions would be much greater.
55. Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 869, 885 (1966).
56. A possible means of arriving at an interest rate would be to tie it to a market index.
Id.

57. In the Hecht case a portion of the damages claimed, although not recovered, was
based upon a similar calculation.
58. Note, supra note 55, at 884.
59. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 435 (N.D.Cal. 1968); Behel, Johnsen
& Co., 26 SEC 163 (1947), E.H. Rollins & Sons, 18 SEC 347, 381 n.50 (1945).
60. 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Ct. App. 1968).
61. The court wrestled with the question of jurisdiction. Although the cause of action involved questions of state law, it was based primarily upon federal law.
62. 262 Cal. App. 2d at 730, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
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from a bare churning violation. In addition to excessive trading, the Twomey
court found that the defendant had handled the account in a manner inconsistent with the plaintiff's investment needs. 63 In Hecht, on the other hand,
the court found that the plaintiff had acquiesced in the active and speculative
nature of the trading.64 The significance of the distinction lies in the causal
relationship between the handling of the account and its diminution in value.
While the distinction is real, it does not seem entirely consistent to say that a
churned account is not improperly handled, thereby dismissing a drop in
portfolio value as a risk of active trading accepted by the customer.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that arriving at a measure of
damages accurately reflective of the plaintiff's injury in a churning situation
necessarily involves speculation and the creation of fictions. Courts, although
frequently willing to be creative to a certain extent, 65 have not been willing to
go to extremes in creative hypothesizing in order to arrive at consistent awards.
For example, a court might readily award total commissions, yet deny recovery
for the diminished value of the account, lost dividends, or taxes. The hesitation seems to stem from a fear of saddling the defendant with liability in excess
of actual damages and an unwillingness to construct hypothetical unchurned
accounts. Assuming the construction of hypothetical accounts is feasible,66 the
failure to assign liability becomes less defensible. The conscious nature of the
offense and the fact that it arises out of a face-to-face relationship should weigh
in favor of adequate compensation despite the large potential liability involved.
Moreover, given the legitimate interest in deterring such conduct, a damage
award that involved little downside risk to the defendant, such as the value of
commissions only, is inadequate.
Another form of broker-dealer conduct that has run afoul of rule 1Ob-5 is
67
the failure to disclose market-maker status. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.68
69
presents the first and, as yet, only case to impose lOb-5 liability on a broker
for failure to disclose market-maker status. The trial court found that, although the defendant had disclosed its role as principal,7° it had not disclosed
71
that it was maintaining a position in the securities for its own account. Such
63. Id. at 720, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
64. See note 47 supra.
65. For example, the Hecht court awarded total commissions based on the underlying assumption that all transactions were improper. The same is true of the taxes awarded in
Stevens. Similarly, Twomey involved the creation of a hypothetical account.
66. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
67. SEC rule 17a-9, 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-9 (1975), defines the term "market maker" as "a
dealer who, with respect to a particular security, holds himself out (by entering indications
of interest in purchasing and selling in an interdealer quotations system or otherwise) as
being willing to buy and sell for his own account on a continuous basis otherwise than on a
national securities exchange."
68. 305 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), af'd, 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
69. Attempts have been made since Chasins to recover on a lOb-5 cause of action for
failure to disclose market maker status. For instance, in Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 8: Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973), the plaintiff failed to demonstrate either
reliance or that he had not received materials indicating the broker was a market maker.
70. Such disclosure is required under SEC rule 15ci-4, 17 C.F.R. §240.15cl-4 (1975).
71. 305 F. Supp. at 495.
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a failure constituted an "omission to state a material fact" in violation of rule
1Ob-5.72 The court relied primarily on the standard of materiality set forth in
List v. FashionPark, Inc.,7 3 holding that an omission is material7 4 if the knowledge of the broker-dealer's market-making position might have influenced the
decision to buy.75 The Second Circuit stated that "disclosure of the fact would
indicate the possibility of adverse interests which might be reflected in Smith,
Barney's recommendation." 6 The defendant broker-dealer asserted that damages should be limited to the difference between the price paid and the fair
market value of the securities on the dates of purchase. 77 Had the court agreed,
the consequence would have been zero damages, because the evidence indicated
that the price paid was the same as that generally available from other dealers. 78 The measure of damages finally determined by the court was the difference between the price paid and the amount plaintiff received when he subsequently sold the securities. 79 The circuit court justified this award on the
ground that the wrong related not to the price at which the securities were
purchased, but the failure of defendants to disclose material facts s which, if
known, might have caused plaintiff to refrain from buying.
One troublesome aspect of the Chasins award is the absence of any proof
that at the time of purchase the securities were not of a character suitable to
plaintiff's needs.8 ' In fact, the district court found that plaintiff had urged the
defendant broker-dealer to speculate.8 2 In other words, there does not seem to
be any causal connection between the wrong committed and plaintiff's loss except for a bare "but for" relation.8 3 This damage award amounts to making
the defendant an insurer of plaintiff's investment.

72. Id. at 496.
73. 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
74. Not only was Chasins the first case to hold that market making position is a material
fact, but the customary course of practice in the industry had been nondisclosure of that fact.
The Second Circuit responded with the statement: "[T]he first litigation of such a practice is
the proper occasion for its outlaw if it is in fact a violation." 438 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir.
1970). Adding to the remarkable nature of this opinion is the general feeling that a market
maker is the best source for the security. Id.
75. 305 F. Supp. at 496.
76. 438 F.2d at 1172. A broker who finds himself in a "long" position might be tempted
to unload the securities for reasons unrelated to the intrinsic worth of the security. Similar
motivation might prompt him to buy up securities if caught in a "short" position.
77. Id. at 1173.
78. Id.
79. Chasins bought the securities for $34,950 and sold them for $16,333.36. Id.
80. Id.
81. It might be argued that since Chasins paid a fair price for what he received, he suffered no actual damages as required by §28 of the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 357 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808
(E.D. Wis. 1962), af'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
82. 305 F. Supp. at 493.
83. There really is not even a "but for" connection in the strictest sense. While the information might have played a part in Chasins' decision, it is not clear that he would have
acted differently had he known.
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An alternative in such cases might be the limitation of recovery to the
broker's commissions, since under the court's analysis the wrong is the sale
itself. Several factors weigh in favor of this more lenient measure of damage.
First, failure to disclose market-maker status had never been considered material prior to Chasins by the SEC or any court. In fact, the general feeling in
the industry is that a market-maker provides the best available market for a
security.8 4 Second, the wrong involved, although possibly intentional in the
sense that it was probably not inadvertent, does not entail the same intent to
defraud as is inherent in churning.8 5 Arguably, the deterrence of such conduct
does not necessitate imposition of insurer liability. Third, because the Chasins
plaintiff fully assumed the risks inherent in speculative trading, 6 he should
be held at least partially accountable for the results.
Defrauded Purchasers
The principal concern of courts in recompensing defrauded buyers8 7 is to
award the plaintiff the difference between what he paid for the security and its
actual value. The traditional valuation preference, first articulated by the
8s
has involved valuing the consideration
Supreme Court in Sigafus v. Porter,
exchanged as of the date of purchase. Normally, the fraud is motivated by
knowledge on the seller's part that the security is worth less than the plaintiff
thinks it is worth, or will shortly decline in value. Typically, the security will
continue to decline in value while held by the plaintiff. Equity would seem to
dictate that in certain instances the plaintiff should recover post-transaction
depreciation. Courts, however, have largely followed the transactional limitation expressed in Sigafus, at least where the securities have been disposed of
89
or rescission is otherwise unavailable.
9
Sarlie v. Bruce" is one instance in which the court departed from a date-ofpurchase valuation. Defendant sued on a market-manipulation counterclaim
84. See note 74 supra.
85. Of course, discovery that the broker was maintaining a long position in the security
or that the recommendation was unsuited to the needs of the customer might provide some
evidence of such "intent."
86. See text accompanying notes 80-82 supra.
87. The Supreme Court recently held in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975), that private damage actions under rule lOb-5 are confined to actual
purchasers or sellers of securities, affirming the so-called Birnbaum rule. Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
88. 179 U.S. 116, 125 (1900): "Upon the assumption that the property was not worth what
the plaintiffs agreed to give for it, they were entitled to have . . . the difference between the
real value of the property at the date of its sale to the plaintiffs and the price paid for
it .. ."
89. See, e.g., Investors Thrift Corp. v. Sexton, 491 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1974); Fershtman v.
Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357, 1361 (2d Cir. 1971); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d
Cir. 1971); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 262 (D. Md. 1971), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 916, 94 S. Ct. 1623 (1974). Professor Loss has suggested that in certain instances the
benefit-of-the bargain rule may "maximize the deterrent effect of Rule 10b-5." 6 L. Loss,
supra note 10, at 3923.
90. 265 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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and won on default. The court awarded as damages the amount of loss sustained on the purchase and total sale of the stock. 91 Conceding that the usual
award in a suit of this kind would be the difference between the stock's actual
value and the manipulated value, both measured at the time of the sale,92 the
court nevertheless pointed out that the counterclaim defendant's own course
of action9- had prevented the application of that measure. 94 This sort of relief
is usually referred to as rescissory, 95 although the court apparently considered
it an out-of-pocket measure. 96 The distinction is really semantic. The only
substantive objection to this type of award in a privity situation is that it
compensates the plaintiff at least partly for risks he assumed when he entered
97
the market.
One rationale for this type of award, especially in market-manipulation
cases, is that the wrong done may have an appreciable effect on the market
price, the extent of which may not be apparent for some time.98 Another
justification might be that, given the fluctuating nature of a security's value,
the defendant should be held at least partly accountable for depreciation on
some sort of foreseeability theory. The underlying idea is that the defendant's
conduct played some part in the plaintiffs decision to buy and the defendant
should not be able to burden the plaintiff with a loss that was the natural consequence of his conduct. The plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages should be
counterbalanced by these considerations. The principal means of preventing
dilatory conduct on the part of the plaintiff is to fix a date of valuation. Thus,
although in at least one case 99 the plaintiff was allowed to offset the difference
in value between the time of purchase and judgment, 10 it seems clear that in
91. Id. at 376.
92. This measure is commonly referred to as "out of pocket."
93. Counterclaim defendant Sarlie repeatedly failed to appear for deposition, and eventually defaulted. 265 F. Supp. at 376.
94. One writer has suggested that courts will depart from the customary measure of damages, as in Chasins and Sarlie, where the defendant's inequitable conduct prevents the plaintiff from proving damages. Comment, Securities Law -Rule 10b-5 -Failure of Broker-Dealer
to Disclose Its Market Maker Status When It Sells to Clients Violates Rule lOb-5, 46 N.Y.U.L.

REv. 187, 197-98 (1971). See also Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under
Rule 10b-5, 1964 WASH. L.Q. 165, 178-79.
95.

See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded

Securities, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 371, 374 (1973).
96. 265 F. Supp. at 376.
97. For example, in Chasins it cannot be said that the commission affected the price of

the stock. Even in Sarlie, where there was a market manipulation, there are a variety of
factors which affect a market fluctuation. See Note, supra note 95, at 375.
98. "The extent of this loss will not necessarily be fully known until some time after the
original transaction. This follows because the same fraudulent practices that induced the

plaintiffs' purchase of the securities also operate on other buyers thereby affecting the prevailing market price. It is not until the existence of the fraudulent conduct is known that
the true value of the securities as an investment can be ascertained." Esplin v. Hirschi, 402
F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
99. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky.
1960), reild on other grounds sub nom. Texas. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d
242 (6th Cir. 1962); Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in
part, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1971).
100. Cf. §11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §577k (1970), which provides a private right of
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most cases either the date of resale or of notice of the fraud places an upper
limit on plaintiff's recovery. It would be inequitable to hold the defendant
responsible for a drop in value beyond the time the security was held by the
plaintiff. Furthermore, the section 28101 prohibition against awards in excess
of actual damages is an express impediment to valuation beyond that date.
Similarly, the plaintiff should not be allowed to speculate at the defendant's
expense by retaining the securities beyond the date on which the fraud is discovered.

102

0
This principle was illustrated in Esplin v. Hirsch,1
3 which involved the
sale of securitieso4 without a disclosure of the rights and privileges of various
classes of stock or the manner in which the assets of the corporation would be
applied if the corporation were unable to remain in business.1o5 At trial, in
answer to special interrogatories, the jury found that on the date of the sale
the securities had a value equal to the purchase price.10 In response to the
defendant's assertion that the date of purchase should fix the damages, the
court stated that where the securities are acquired for investment purposes that is, with an intent to retain them for a long period of time - the actual
extent of the loss is not ascertainable until the fraud is discovered. Accordingly, damages were determined to be the difference between the price paid
and the value of the securities on the date the plaintiffs were charged with
notice of the fraud.J0 7
In Gottlieb v. Sandia American Corp., 0 8 the defendant corporation acquired World Wide Corporation through an exchange of stock. The court

recovery for injury caused by misleading registration statements. This section allows the value
of the security to be offset as of the date suit is brought, or earlier if sold before suit is
brought. Besides providing substantive defenses, the section allows the defendant to prove
that all or part of the depreciation in value was due to factors other than the wrongful
conduct. Courts have wrestled with the problem of extraneous market factors affecting price
in the lOb-5 area, but in most cases, because of the uncertainty involved, have held the
defendant liable for the entire decline in value. Section 12 of the 1933 Act, 14 U.S.C. §771
(1970), which provides a civil remedy for violations of the §5 prospectus and registration requirements, allows rescission or damages, but requires strict rescission when possible.
101. 78 U.S.C. §78bb (1970).
102. See note 100 supra.
103. 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
104. Although the court does not allude to the possibility, plaintiffs in this case may have
had a valid cause of action under §12(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §771 (1970), for selling
a security in violation of §5, 15 U.S.C. §77e (1970), since no prospectus was used in selling
the securities (apparently the securities were not registered either). One explanation for the
failure to include a §12 count might be that the offering was subject to a valid exemption.
Another possibility is that some plaintiffs would have failed the strict privity requirements
of §12. Since the suit was initially brought as a class action, various members of the class
had probably received their stock from persons other than the defendant. Had the Hirsches
been able to maintain suit under §12, they would have been entitled to a recovery in excess
of that actually obtained. Because the securities were still in their possession at the time of
suit, under §12 rescission would have been appropriate.
105. 402 F.2d at 95-96.
106. ld. at 104.
107. Id. at 105.
108. 304 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1969), ajf'd in part, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 938 (1971).
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found that the officers and directors of the acquiring corporation had violated
rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose material facts relating to the acquiring corporation's financial condition.0 9 Several problems existed with respect to fashioning an adequately compensatory measure of relief. The court acknowledged
that the normal measure of damages would be the difference between the value
of the respective stocks on the date of the exchange. Because the real value of
the acquiring corporation's stock was a matter uniquely within the knowledge
of defendant, however, an accurate valuation was impossible. 110 Strict rescission
was also rejected because the officers of the acquiring corporation had spun off
their holdings in the acquired corporation's stock."' Similarly, the Esplin
measure was inappropriate due to the difficulty of determining the value of
the consideration paid and received."1 2 The court finally settled on damages
based on the value of the acquired company's stock at the time of the exchange. Upon tender of the worthless acquiring corporation's stock, each plaintiff would be entitled to a pro rata share of the estimated value of the acquired
company's stock plus 6 percent interest until the date of judgment."'1
The common denominator in the cases that have calculated a damage
award based on a post-transaction valuation of the securities is either an inability to value the consideration at the time of the transfer,".4 or a finding
that the true value of the security equalled the price paid on the date of purchase. 1 5 Despite isolated intimations to the contrary," 6 it appears that in a
defrauded-purchaser situation, courts will allow a post-transaction valuation
only where the alternative is zero damages or an inability to calculate the
actual value of the security at the time of purchase.
The only remedy expressly provided by the Securities Exchange Act is contained in Section 29(b),' which allows strict rescission for violation of any
section. 1 8 Despite the undeniable existence of the rescissionary remedy in \the
statute, courts have been prone to regard it as extraordinary,"19 or to impose
restrictions on its use beyond those specified in the section. 20 The reason is
109. Id. at 992.
110. When the exchange took place, World Wide stock was untradable. Shortly thereafter
Sandia became untradable. Furthermore, the court reasoned that it would be necessary to take
into account the true state of affairs at Sandia in order to determine the value of its stock,
something about which those who knew would not tell. Id. at 989-90.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see note 110 supra.
113. Id. at 991.
114. E.g., Sarlie v. E.L. Bruce Co. 265 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (inability to value
caused by defendant's default and failure to appear for deposition).
115. E.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 488 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970); Esplin v. Hirschi,
402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir" 1968).
116. See note 98 supra.

117. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78cc(b) (1970).
118. The section provides in pertinent part: "Every contract made in violation of any
" Where a broker-dealer is involved, an acprovision of this chapter ... shall be void ..
tion under §29 must be brought within one year after the discovery that a sale or purchase
involves a §29 violation, and within three years after such violation. 15 U.S.C. §78cc(b) (1970).
119. E.g., John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1971); Gilbert v.
Meyer, 362 F. Supp. 168, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
120. See note 11 supra; Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1968).
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that private recovery under rule lOb-5 is premised on an implied right of action rather than one granted by statute,12 ' and carries with it the incidents of
common law development. For obvious reasons, equitable limitations of estop122
pel and waiver have been read into the act's conferral of the right to rescind.
Absent a judicially imposed requirement of diligence, a buyer could sit out the
applicable statute of limitation 123 with an eye on the market. It has been held
that to invoke the estoppel defense, the defendant must demonstrate a lack of
diligence on the part of the plaintiff and prejudice to the defendant.124 In the
context of the defrauded buyer, the injury stems from the usually continuing
decline in the value of the security that the plaintiff later seeks to return to the
defendant. 125 With respect to defrauded sellers, just the opposite situation op126
erates to the detriment of the defendant.
The usual measure of damages is the traditional out-of-pocket award that
purports to compensate the plaintiff for his actual loss127 measured at the time
of the transaction. As has been pointed out elsewhere,1 28 the justification for
departure from this standard toward an award taking into account post-transaction depreciation is the notion that, given the nature of securities fraud, the
injury may go beyond that of an initially bad bargain. In fact, the plaintiff
may have paid a fair price for the security.129 In this situation, the plaintiff
may not have suffered a cognizable injury at all under an out-of-pocket theory.
Departure from common law strictures 130 is also justified where actual damages are suffered at the time of the transaction and the plaintiff suffers further
damages while unaware of the fraud. Given the fluctuating value of securities
and the almost certain post-transaction loss, even semantic adherence to an
out-of-pocket measure may be unwarranted in certain cases. Arguably, with the
easing of lOb-5 proof requirements,'21 damages measured at the time of the
transaction may be justified. For instance, where there is no showing of
scienter, the policy of deterrence should play little part in the damage calcula121. See note 5 supra.
122. E.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964); Gordon v.
Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250,
261 (D. Md. 1971), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). See also Estate Counseling Service, Inc.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962), where the court
read in common law election of remedies.
123. Generally, federal courts will borrow the statute of limitations of the state in which
they sit. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Corp., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Gilbert v. Meyer, 362
F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
124. Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); John Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 261 (D. Md. 1971), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
125. 366 F. Supp. at 171.
126. See text accompanying note 154 infra.
127. One case appears to have awarded benefit-of-the-bargain damages. See Hartwell
Corp. v. Bumb, 345 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1965).
128. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
129. E.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970); Esplin v. Hirschi,
402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
130. An exception at common law to the out-of-pocket standard was the New York rule,
which allowed the average highest price between the time of sale and the date of judgment.
C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 187 (1935).
131. See note 5 supra.
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tion.132 Similarly, in an omission case where the nondisclosure affects plaintiff's loss only in the sense that the withheld information might have influenced the decision to buy, strict out-of-pocket damages may be sufficiently
33
compensatory. The same is not true, however, in a market-manipulation case
where the defendant's conduct is designed to affect the market price.
DefraudedSellers
The principal theory of compensatory damage awards to defrauded sellers
is the same as that applicable to defrauded buyers - transaction valuation.
While valuation at the time of the transaction remains the preferred approach,
departure from this rule has not met with the same degree of judicial resistance
encountered in the defrauded buyer context.
The greatest frequency of strict out-of-pocket recovery 34 is found in derivative suits.'1 5 Perhaps this is due to judicial sensitivity to the magnitude of potential damages. The explanation most frequently voiced is that the theory of
derivative suits - harm to the corporation - limits damages to out-of-pocket
relief. 3 6 This explanation is untenable because the harm done may exceed the
difference between the transactional value given and that received, whether
the plaintiff is a corporation or an individual.
In Norte & Co. v. Hufllnes, 37 plaintiff stockholders sued three defendant
directors on behalf of the corporation, seeking damages caused by the fraudulent issuance of stock in exchange for the overvalued stock of an acquired
corporation that was 77 percent owned by defendants. 1 1 At trial, the court
found that the corporation had been harmed in the amount of $2,993,000 as a
result of transactions initiated by defendants in the corporation's stock.13 9
Damages were found to equal the difference between the actual value of the
acquired corporation's stock and the acquiring corporation's stock issued in
the exchange. On motion for rehearing on the issue of damages, the defendants
132. This argument recognizes that the in terrorem effect of the securities laws is said to
be designed to encourage diligence as well as discourage intentional fraud. It can be argued,
however, that the policy is aimed primarily at rather large undertakings, capable of having
market impact.
133. E.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
134. Strict "out-of-pocket" as used in this context means the difference in value between
the security transferred and the consideration received at the time of the transaction.
135. E.g., Norte 8: Co. v. Huffines, 288 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); aff'd, 416 F.2d 1189
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1968), on remand, 303 F. Supp. 1257

(1969).
136. E.g., Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 361 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D. Ohio 1973),
vacated, 498 F.2d 186 (1974).
137. 288 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
138. Id. at 857.
139. In the first transaction (Sept. 6, 1961) defendants personally acquired 10% of the
issued stock of IEE at a price of $20.94 per share. Later, through the use of false and misleading proxy material, defendants caused Defiance to issue 487,502 shares of its class B Voting Stock in exchange for all of the stock of IEE valued by the defendants at $70.51 per share.
Id.
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contended the acquiring corporation's stock was worth less than the $14.49
per share found by the court, pointing to the $8.00 market price on the date of
the exchange. 140 The court denied the motion on the basis of an appraisal commissioned by the defendants prior to the exchange. The appraisal took into
account not only market price, but also asset value, earning power, past per1 41

formance, and future potential.
Another method of valuation was employed in Pappas v. Moss.

42

Under

similar circumstances, the Pappascourt calculated out-of-pocket damages based
entirely on market price. The defendant directors had caused 143 the corporation to issue shares to a small buying group, including the defendants, at less
than true value.1 44 Damages were calculated as the difference between the selling price and the average market price less a reasonable discount. 45
The different valuation method utilized in Hufines might stem from the
unique circumstances of the case. First, the appraisal prior to the exchange
presented a convenient valuation of the corporation's stock, one the defendant
would be hard pressed to challenge. Second, during the relevant period there
was a thin market in the acquiring corporation's stock, tending to make market
price a poor indicator of public preference. 46 Finally, and probably most important, had damages been pegged to market price, the result would have been
little or no recovery to the corporation.14 7 The reference to extrinsic factors in
Huffines presaged post-transaction valuation where the stock has appreciated
in the hands of the fraudulent party.
The most obvious attempt to incorporate a restitution measure of damages
within the semantic confines of a strict out-of-pocket award is found in Ross v.
45
Licht.1
Defendants purchased stock from plaintiffs at $120 per share without
disclosing a planned private offering at $300 per share and a public offering
at $600 per share. The court described the correct measure of damages in the
traditional out-of-pocket sense,' 4 9 but then added that the true value of the
securities was to be "determined from all the pertinent circumstances both
from a reasonable time before the sale and after it."'15 "All pertinent circumstances" included the price at which the shares were sold in the subsequent
140.

Id. at 857-61.

141. Id. at 858.
142. 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968),
on remand, 303 F. Supp. 1257 (1969).
143. Plaintiffs alleged among other things that the defendants falsely represented to the
corporation that the private investor group required the participation of the corporation's
directors in the purchase of the $6.00 shares but that the price was prescribed by the private
group. Id. at 349.
144. Id. at 364.
145. Id. at 364-65.
146. "The thinness of the market in Defiance stock was recognized by the defendants as
rendering current market prices inappropriate for evaluation purposes." Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 288 F. Supp. 855, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
147. Id. at 857.
148. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
149. The court described the damages as "the difference between the 'fair value' when
plaintiffs sold their shares and the price at which they sold." Id. at 410.
150. Id., quoting Broffe v. Horton, 172 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 1949).
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private offering. Accordingly, the plaintiffs recovered the difference between
the amount actually received in the sale ($120 per share) and the price received in the private offering ($300 per share).151 In theory, the Licht award
does not really differ significantly from those discussed in Huffines and Moss.
In each case, damages were based on the value of the stock at the time of the
transaction; the Licht court merely referred to intrinsic factors occurring after
the transaction in reaching this valuation. In fact, Hufines and Licht bear a
marked resemblance to one another in one respect: reliance upon an unarticulated estoppel concept. In both cases, the defendants were stuck with
their own valuation of the stock. The underlying notion in all three cases is
that determination of the value of the security at the time of the transaction
may necessitate reference to a variety of factors.
52
A different theory characterizes the damage award in Janigan v. Taylor.s
Janigan represents a shift from a strict notion of compensation to one of
restitution.'53 This conceptual shift is not unjustified. In the defrauded buyer
context, typically the defendant has realized the extent of his profit at the
moment of the transaction, while the defrauded buyer's loss will probably increase as long as he holds the security. In the defrauded seller situation, the
fraud is usually motivated by a belief either that the security is more valuable
than the seller knows, or will be shortly. In many instances, the security in the
defrauding party's hands increases in value beyond its value at the time of the
transaction. If it can be said that, except for the fraudulent conduct, the seller
would have retained the securities, it seems reasonable to say that he should
be allowed to enjoy the gains he would have experienced had there been no
fraud. Moreover, to the extent that the defendant's gain is directly attributable
to the fraud, the defendant should not be allowed to retain ill-gotten profits.
In Janigan, the defendant corporation president purchased virtually all of the
company's outstanding stock for $40,000. Two years later he sold it for
$700,000. The trial court held that the defendant had misrepresented the true
state of the company to the plaintiffs and awarded them defendant's total
profits. 5 4 The court noted that it may be entirely speculative whether, if
plaintiffs had not sold, the series of fortunate occurrences would have happened in the same way, "but concluded that whether foreseeable or not, the
profit was the natural consequence of the fraud."' 55
The Janigan award does contain a limitation applicable in instances where
the defendant has contributed in an extraordinary manner to the appreciation
in value. 56 This contribution argument was pressed unsuccessfully in Myzel v.
151. Id. at 411.
152. 344 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965), afJ'g, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D.
Mass. 1962), 230 F. Supp. 858 (D. Mass. 1964).
153. This is not to say that the court did not consider compensation important. The significance lies in the fact that the court didn't stop at the notion of compensation as a limitation on recovery.
154. 344 F.2d at 783-86.
155. Id. at 786.
156. The court analogized to the artist who obtained paints through fraud and produced
a masterpiece. Under these circumstances, the defrauded party would not be entitled to the
full extent of the defendant's gain. In the instant case, the defendant's own testimony op-
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Fields,'

where, as in Janigan, the defendant directors and salaried officers

contended that their extraordinary contributions appreciably raised the value
of the stock. Unlike Janigan, the Fields defendants attempted to demonstrate
specific instances of conduct beyond that called for in the normal course of
events, such as personal guarantees of bank loans for working capital and the
introduction of new lines of business. The court nevertheless rejected this
argument, finding that such activities were not totally unforeseeable in the
growth of a closely held corporation. 15
The Janigan limitation seemed more theoretical than real until Rochez
Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades."59 Defendant Rhoades bought out a fellow 50 percent owner's interest in a corporation without disclosing the existence of prospective purchasers of the business. Although Rhoades was initially unsuccessful
in his efforts, he later sold the corporation at a very substantial gain. 6 0 The
trial court followed the Janigan valuation approach, but limited the damage
award to an intermediate offer for the company rather than the ultimate sales
price. 16' The early valuation cutoff was deemed justified because much of the
later increase in value was due to the aggressive management of Rhoades.
Furthermore, the court reasoned, had Rhoades made appropriate disclosure,
plaintiff would have received a value for his stock fixed by the offer outstanding on that date.162 This aspect of the court's reasoning assumes that the plaintiff would still have sold had he known of the offers extant, but that he would
have been able to do so at a higher price. This assumption is supported by the
finding that Rhoades and the plaintiff were constantly at loggerheads, causing
a gradual stagnation of the company.' 6 3 On appeal, 6 4 the Third Circuit modified the measure of damages, increasing recovery to the full extent of the
Janigan measure.' 65 The court found that even though Rhoades' aggressive
management might accurately have been described as constituting a special
effort beyond the duties for which he was compensated, it nonetheless fell short
of the type of personal effort contemplated by Janigan.
In effect, Rochez has destroyed whatever vitality the Janigan limitation
possessed. If activities above and beyond normally compensated duties, as well
as unique personal attributes, fall short of the contemplated "special efforts,"
one might wonder what sort of effort would suffice.166
erated to his detriment. He testified that the "turnaround" was due to price rises and increased efficiency, as well as an improvement in the business cycle affecting the company's
customers. The court reasoned that since the defendant had received his salary for doing his
normal duty, he had no claim to any of the profits. Id. at 787.
157. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).

158. ld. at 747.
159. 353 F. Supp. 795 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
160.

Id. at 799-801.

161.

Id. at 804.

162. Id. at 803-04.
163. "They were in the position of the two men in the allegorical story of heaven and
hell who found themselves confronting a delectable feast, but unable to bend their elbows so
as to bring the food to their mouths." Id.
164. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973).

165. Id. at 412.
166. Perhaps the example of the fraudulent artist in Janigan indicates unique individual

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

19

19751

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 3
RULE lOb-5 DAMAGES

The principal objection to the circuit court decision is its disregard for
what amounted to a finding of fact by the trial court that even had Rhoades
made full disclosure, the plaintiff would still have sold out.16

7

Assuming the

object of a damage award is to construct a nonfraudulent situation for the
plaintiff, it would seem that the measure of damages employed by the trial
court was proper.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 68 in which the Supreme Court ratified the Janiganmeasure of damage
without mention of the Janigan limitation169 It can be argued, however, that
by approving Janigan, the Affiliated Ute Citizens Court also incorporated its
limitations.17O Although not mentioned in Affiliated Ute Citizens, equity would
seem to dictate that actual or constructive notice of the fraud should also operate to limit the plaintiff's recovery."'1 On petition for rehearing7 2 Rhoades
argued that the plaintiff's recovery should be determined as of the date that
the plaintiff was told of the first offer. The court rejected his contention on
grounds that Affiliated Ute Citizens unequivocally extended recovery to the
amount garnered by the defendant on resale, and that the information the
plaintiff received was not sufficient to put him on actual notice of the fraud.'73
The Rochez court's reliance on Affiliated Ute Citizens in this regard is somewhat overextended, if the implication to be drawn is that Affiliated Ute Citizens condones even flagrantly dilatory conduct.
Besides disgorgement of profit, the Affiliated Ute Citizens Court stated that
the plaintiff could receive the difference between the fair value of what the
seller received and what he would have received had there been no fraud, if
that amount exceeds defendant's gain. 74 In most instances the two will be the
same, because the test of materiality employed in Affiliated Ute Citizens assumes that if there had been no fraudulent conduct, the plaintiff would have
held on to the security and received what the defendant ultimately collected.
In instances where it appears that the plaintiff would still have sold, but at an

talent, or character traits. Rhoades closely approaches this model. Rhoades was apparently a
uniquely hard-driving, gambling, aggressive businessman. The trial court indicated that it
was the energy and inventiveness he brought to his work rather than the nature of the duties
he performed that increased the value of the business. 353 F. Supp. at 803-04.
167. See text accompanying notes 162, 163 supra.
168. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
169. Under Affiliated Ute Citizens the correct measure of damages is the difference between the fair value of what was received for the stock and what would have been received
had there been no fraudulent conduct "except for the situation where the defendant received
more than the seller's actual loss. In the latter case damages are the amount of the defendant's
profit." Id. at 155.
170. The Third Circuit majority in Rhoades did note that the Janigan limitation may be
incorporated in the Affiliated Ute Citizens measure. 491 F.2d at 413.
171. The notion is that the purpose of the limitation is to prevent the defrauded party
from unreasonably delaying commencement of the suit in order to benefit from the increasing
value of this security.
172. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1974).
173. Id. at 416.
174. 406 U.S. at 155.
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intermediate price, 175 the defendant's profits are still recoverable under Af1
filiated Ute Citizens.76

As in the defrauded buyer cases, rescission is regarded as a drastic remedy,
depending on diligence by the plaintiff and, possibly, investigation. Baumel v.
Rosen 17 7 is thought to set the standard for rescission. In Baumel, the Fourth
Circuit stated: "[Rescission] is stringently administered. Reasonable time is
inceptive from the receipt by the rescinder of word putting him on notice. It
is then incumbent upon him to pick up the scent and nose to the source.'1 7
Although Affiliated Ute Citizens did not directly address the remedy of rescission, it seems unlikely that its liberal overtones will not be felt in that area of
damage law. If the Rochez court is correct in its assertion that Affiliated Ute
Citizens unequivocally and without limitation allows rescissory damages, it
seems unlikely that the limitations attached to strict rescission will survive.
Open Market Transactions
While disgorgement of defendant's profits in privity situations has operated
as an upper limit on total recovery, the reverse is true in non-privity transactions. The trend in impersonal fraud cases1 79 has been toward full compensation of all injured traders in the market, to the extent of potentially ruinous
liability for the defrauding party.
The specter of gargantuan class recovery first reared its head in the wake
of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,5 0 the first case in which insiders who had
tipped and traded on non-public information were forced to disgorge profits.""' Additionally, the court found a press release issued by the defendant
discounting rumors of a significant mineral discovery to be materially misleading to the reasonable investor.' 8 2 This virtual invitation to bring class actions
was widely accepted. 8 3 Thus far, the only court since Texas Gulf Sulphur to
175. See text accompanying note 167 supra.
176. It should be noted that under Affiliated Ute Citizens, inquiry into plaintiff's loss is
not foreclosed in instances where the value declines, or the defendant's ultimate profit is less
than the initial loss.
177. 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1037 (1970), afi'd in part, 283
F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968).
178. Id. at 574.
179. As used in this context, personal and impersonal have the same meanings as privity
and nonprivity.
180. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand,
312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). For an in-depth elucidation
of the facts see Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: The Question of Remedy, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 486
(1970).
181. 446 F.2d at 1307. The SEC is given power to seek injunctive relief under §21(e) of
the 1934 Act. The defendants contended with some force that ancillary relief available to the
SEC was limited to that necessary to enforce an injunction. The court rejected that argument,
stating that district courts are given broad equity powers to fashion relief, including restitution, under the 1934 Act. See generally J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
182. 446 F.2d 1301, 1305 (2d Cir. 1971).
183. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 566 (D. Utah 1970);
Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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reach the merits and award damages dismissed the suit as a class action, primarily because of class actions pending elsewhere. 8 4 In Reynolds v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,' s5 damages were awarded to three individuals who had sold
stock in reliance on the misleading press release. 8 6 Two of the plaintiffs had
sold between the date of the misleading release and the day after a curative
announcement was released; the third had sold stock five days after the curative
release. 87 The measure of recovery was based on the average highest daily per
share selling price between the date of the curative release 88 and the following
twenty trading days. 8 9 On appeal the Tenth Circuit in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.190 modified the measure of damages, granting plaintiffs the
amount it would have taken a reasonable investor to reinvest in the Texas
Gulf Sulphur market within a reasonable period of time after he had become
informed of the curative press release.' 9' The court found that the reasonable
investor would have become apprised of the true state of affairs four days after
the curative release. This holding precluded recovery by the investor who had
sold five days later. The remaining two plaintiffs recovered damages based
upon the highest value of Texas Gulf Sulphur stock between four days after
the curative release and a reasonable time (9 days) thereafter for reinvestment. 92 Both the district court and the court of appeals were motivated by a
desire to construct a nonfraudulent situation for the plaintiffs. Both courts
attempted to restore to the plaintiffs an opportunity they would have had but
for the fraud. While this is not objectionable, and is even commendable in a
face-to-face setting, full compensation should not keynote the open market
transaction damage award where the potential liability is greatly disproportionate to defendant's fault.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur damage rationale was extended to purchaserinsiders in Fridich v. Bradford, 93 a nondisclosure case. The court found that
defendant-insiders had traded in Old Line Life Insurance stock from April 19,
184. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 566, 567 (D. Utah 1970).
185. 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), modified sub nom. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).

186. It is interesting to note that only the corporation and Fogarty, the party responsible
for the misleading release and a nontrader, were made defendants. The failure to include the
traders might have been due to the fact that silence had not been established forcefully as a
ground for individual relief. Since Affiliated Ute Citizens, there has been no doubt that a
private right of action lies agaisist insiders trading on public information.

187. 309 F. Supp. at 559-61.
188. Id. at 564-65. On April 16, Texas Gulf Sulphur made a public announcement admitting the discovery of the ore.

189. Id.
190. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971). Fogarty and TGS argued that only actual damages

based on market value as of April 16 were recoverable, while plaintiffs asked for restitutionary damages. Id. at 104-05.
191. Id. at 105.
192. Id. Had the trial court measure been upheld, potential damages would have
amounted to $14 million. Rescissory damages according to one calculation could have
amounted to between $84 and $390 million. Id. at 105 n.13, citing Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur
- The Second Round, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 428-29 (1969).
193. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1194,723 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
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1972 through November 10, 1972, a period of 148 trading days, 94 without disclosing favorable inside information. Damages amounting to over $350,000
were awarded to individual plaintiffs based upon the highest price of Old Line
for a period of 20 days following disclosure. 195 While the plaintiffs in Fridich
had sold during a three day period, presumably under the reasoning of
Mitchell and Fridich, any investor who had sold stock within the 148 day
period would have been entitled to relief. Moreover, since Affiliated Ute Citizens, the reliance requirement has virtually been abandoned in nondisclosure
cases.' 96 Seemingly the only prerequisite to a class recovery is proof that the
information withheld was material.
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.197 represents the
reverse side of the coin. Viewing well-pleaded facts as admitted, the court
found that nontrading tippers and trading tippees in possession of adverse
inside information were liable to members of the investing public who purchased stock in ignorance of the inside information during the same period. 9 8
Determination of damages, as well as the issue of the suitability of a class
action, was remanded to the district court for consideration.? 99 It is evident
that if class action status is granted, the class will comprise all those who
bought stock during the period of trading and nondisclosure. 20 0 Obviously, the
rationale of the award allowed in Fridich and Mitchell is inapplicable to the
Shapiro situation because the plaintiffs, if they no longer hold the stock, would
not wish to buy back into the market. The award, however, will probably be
similar. Applying the reasonable investor criteria of Mitchell and Fridich, the
parallel recovery in a defrauded buyer case would be the difference between
the purchase price and the lowest market price within a reasonable period
after the investor should have become apprised of the facts.
The Fridich and Shapiro cases differ analytically from Mitchell. In Mitchell, liability arose from an affirmative misrepresentation, while in Fridich and
Shapiro liability was triggered by a combination of trading and nondisclosure.
In Mitchell the conduct can reasonably be said to have "caused" the injury.201
In Fridich and Shapiro, on the other hand, the nondisclosure can be said to
have "caused" the plaintiffs to buy or sell only in a very limited sense, as the
defendants in Shapiro contended with no success. Relying heavily on Affiliated
Ute Citizens, which involved face-to-face transactions, the court stated that the
would not have
causation requirement was satisfied by the fact that plaintiffs
20 2
information.
inside
the
of
aware
been
they
had
bought
194. Id. at ff 96,399, 96,400, 96,405.
195. Id. at fi196,406-07.
196. See note 5 supra.
197. 495 F.2d (2d Cir. 1974), aIJ'g 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
198. Id. at 236-37.
199. Id. at 241.
200. While the court of appeals refrained from directly addressing the class action issue,
it indicated that defendants would be liable to all of those who had purchased the stock
during the four-day period of insider trading.
201. To the extent the plaintiffs' decisions to sell were influenced by defendant's misrepresentation, plaintiffs lost the subsequent increment in the value of the stock.
202. 495 F.2d at 240.
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Reeder v. Mastercraft2 3 presents the final possibility in the open-market
transaction situation: investors who are induced to buy stock on the basis of
favorable but misleading statements. Reeder goes beyond any of the previously
discussed cases by awarding strict rescission and rescissory damages. 20 4 This
award is perhaps justified on the ground that an offering of stock was involved,
thus making the corporation a seller. Had there been a false and misleading
registration statement, instead of the absence of a registration statement, suit
under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 would have produced similar
205
damages.
A number of considerations militate in favor of revising current judicial
thinking regarding the damage calculation for rule lOb-5 fraud in the open
market. First, the ultimate victims are likely to be the innocent shareholders
of publicly held corporations. 206 Given the purpose of rule lOb-5 to protect
innocent investors, 207 this result seems intolerable. Second, the potential liability vastly exceeds that needed to deter even intentional conduct. Third, because lOb-5 liability may be predicated on less than intentionally fraudulent
conduct,2 08 damages may be greatly disproportionate to fault. Fourth, compensation as a rationale for damage awards loses much of its force in class actions,
where it is likely that a relatively large proportion of the plaintiff class will not
participate in the award.
Any solution aimed at reducing potential damages must begin by rejecting
the compensation of every open market buyer as a practicable end result. It is
necessary, however, that the damage threat remain at a level sufficient to deter
lOb-5 violations and attract private litigation. Because the threat of draconian
liability arises principally in the context of class suits, one solution would be
to formulate means of discouraging class actions2 09 without detracting from
the attractiveness of individual private suits. There is a great deal of force in

203. 363 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
204. Ad. at 581-82.
205. Rescission would not have been available under §11, but rescissory damages measured at the commencement of suit would have been available. 15 U.S.C. §77k (1970).
206. See Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972
U. ILL. L.F. 651, 668. One author suggests that damages be apportioned between the stockholders and plaintiffs. Note, Liability Under Rule 10b-5 For Negligently Misleading Corporate Releases: A Proposalfor the Apportionment of Losses, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 162, 173 (1973).
207. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., CCH Fa. SEc. L. RP.
9 f94,473, 95,659 (2d Cir. 1974).
208. A number of courts have dispensed with the scienter requirement in privity cases.
E.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). Given Shapiro's lack of restraint in applying the Affiliated Ute Citizens reliance rule to the impersonal market, it seems likely that the
necessity of scienter will similarly be abandoned.
209. One author has suggested that private suits be forbidden by legislation and the SEC
be given exclusive authority for enforcing lOb-5 on the impersonal market. The endeavor is
to be financed by the damages collected in the suits. This solution overlooks the fact that
most lOb-5 violations do not come to light in absence of an aggrieved complaintant, and
without the spur of private recovery it is doubtful whether most violations would come to
light. Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges,
74 COLub. L. Rsv. 299 (1974).
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the argument that the broad purposes of federal securities legislation are best
served by relaxation of the common law elements of fraud. This policy need
not extend, however, beyond individual private suits. The purposes of the Act
would be adequately served if some of the requirements, such as proximate
cause and reliance, were reintroduced in class actions. The result might be the
interjection of questions which would affect individual members to the extent
that predominance over common questions would defeat the class action under
the Federal Rules. 210
Another alternative would be to limit damages directly. In those situations
where the defendants have profited from their actions, an upper limit on damages might be the amount of profit garnered from trading plus an amount of
interest that would create a downside risk for any investment the trader might
make with his profits. In a situation such as Shapiro, where the tipping defendant has not traded but has earned commissions on the trades of his tippees, similar damages might be extracted on the basis of his profits. When the
tipper has not profited at all, there is less necessity for deterrence since the
probability of recurrence of conduct that is not financially motivated is, at
least arguably, relatively slight. Even so, the tipper might be made liable for
a portion of his tippees' profits. One possible situation that has not yet been
addressed is one involving a party who affirmatively misrepresents but does
not trade or tip. The misrepresentation may have a definite effect on the
market. An upper limit on resultant damages might be calculated by increasing the market effect by applying an arbitrary multiplier. For instance, in a
situation similar to Texas Gulf Sulphur, the market effect might have been
measured by the difference between the market price on the date of the misrepresentation and that reached at a point when the curative release had been
public for a sufficient time to have had its effect on the market. The multiplier
might be reached by taking a percentage of those who traded between the
misrepresentation and the curative release.
Removing the emphasis from compensation suggests a section 28 argument
that punitive damages are being imposed. The force of that argument is greatly
mitigated, however, by the fact that such an award would fall short of an
award based strictly on compensation.211
CONCLUSION

While damage awards in the private market context have not been free of
inconsistency, the different approaches that have been discussed at least share
the common goal of compensation. The overriding significance of rule 1Ob-5
in this area has been in the easing of the traditional substantive requirements
of common law fraud. The damage rationale, while influenced somewhat by
the policies underlying l0b-5, has remained largely the same. This is appropriate since the greatest efficacy of rule lOb-5 lies in its ability to influence conduct capable of having a market impact. In the open market context the
210. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
211. Section 28 only operates by its own terms to put an upper limit on plaintiff's recovery at actual damages. 15 U.S.C. §78bb (1970).
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